Abstract-A source model for secret key generation between terminals is considered. Two users, namely users 1 and 2, at one side communicate with another user, namely user 3, at the other side via a public channel where three users can observe i.i.d. outputs of correlated sources. Each of users 1 and 2 intends to share a secret key with user 3 where user 1 acts as a wiretapper for user 2 and vice versa. In this model, two situations are considered: communication from users 1 and 2 to user 3 (the forward key strategy) and from user 3 to users 1 and 2 (the backward key strategy). In both situations, the goal is sharing a secret key between user 1 and user 3 while leaking no effective information about that key to user 2, and simultaneously, sharing another secret key between user 2 and user 3 while leaking no effective information about the latter key to user 1. This model is motivated by wireless communications when considering user 3 as a base station and users 1 and 2 as network users. In this paper, for both the forward and backward key strategies, inner and outer bounds of secret key capacity regions are derived. In special situations where one of users 1 and 2 is only interested in wiretapping and not key sharing, our results agree with that of Ahlswede and Csiszar. Also, we investigate some special cases in which the inner bound coincides with the outer bound and secret key capacity region is deduced.
INTRODUCTION
Because of the open nature of wireless communication networks, sharing secret keys between terminals is a challenging problem. In these environments, terminals have access to common randomness for generating secret keys but the existence of broadcast and multiple access channels in these networks results in unintended information leakage. In this paper, we explore the problem of sharing secret keys between three users who can observe the outputs of some correlated sources. There are two users, namely user 1 and user 2, at one side and another user, namely user 3, at the other side and also public channels between the users. User 1 wishes to share a secret key with user 3 while user 2 acts as a wiretapper and intends to learn information about this key as much as possible. Symmetrically, user 2 wishes to share a secret key with user 3 while user 1 acts as a wiretapper and intends to learn information about this key as much as possible. This model could be realized in wireless environment when user 3 is a base station and users 1 and 2 are curious network users.
The rigorous idea of information theoretic security was first introduced by Shannon in [11] where the eavesdropper could listen to all the data transmitted from the transmitter to the receiver. After that, the notion of information theoretic security was characterized by Wyner as the wiretap channel model in which a single source-destination communication link is eavesdropped by a wiretapper via a degraded channel [13] . The secrecy level was measured by equivocation rate at the wiretapper. It was shown in [13] that nonzero secrecy rate can be achieved without using a secret key, if the intended receiver has a communication channel with better quality than the wiretapper. Csiszar and Korner in their seminal work [2] generalized the Wyner's results to less noisy and more capable channels and determined the capacity region of the broadcast channel with confidential message. In [1] and [8] , generation of secret key through common randomness was considered by Maurer, Ahlswede and Csiszar. The common randomness can be a source or a channel type. In source common randomness, all terminals including the transmitter, the receiver and the wiretapper could observe i.i.d. outputs of correlated sources. In channel common randomness, there is a noisy broadcast channel from the transmitter to the receiver and the wiretapper. In both the source and channel common randomness, there is a noiseless public channel with unlimited capacity between the transmitter and the receiver where all communication through which can be overheard by the wiretapper. In [1] , based on common randomness type, the source and channel models were defined for secret key sharing and in both models, the problem of finding the secret key capacity between the transmitter and the receiver was considered. In the source model, the secret key capacity was characterized when a one-way noiseless public channel with unlimited capacity is available between the transmitter and the receiver. In case a two-way public channel exists between the transmitter and the receiver, the secret key capacity still remains an open problem, however its upper and lower bounds have been improved in [5] and [10] . Secret key generation in a network including more than three terminals has been explored in other works such as [3] , [4] , [6] , [7] , [14] , [15] . Maurer [9] strengthened the secrecy conditions of [1] and [8] and showed that the results in a weak sense can be established in the strong sense by using the techniques developed in [9] .
As mentioned above, the problem of sharing secret keys between terminals which have access to correlated sources was defined in [1] , in which the transmitter and the receiver intend to share a key via public channel communications. In this model, a wiretapper who has access to side information correlated with other sources, can listen to the public channel and obtains information about the shared key as much as possible. In this paper, we propose a new model which differs from the source model of [1] (which was described in the previous paragraph), in such a way that both users 1 and 2 attempt to share secret keys with user 3 while user 1 is the wiretapper of user 2's secret key and vice versa. Three users have access to correlated sources and there is a public channel from users 1 and 2 to user 3. To the best of our knowledge, this model has not been investigated so far. For this model, we investigate two situations. In the first, there is a one-way public channel from users 1 and 2 to user 3. This situation is referred to as the forward key strategy and is shown in Fig.1 .
In the second one, there is a one-way public channel from user 3 to users 1 and 2. This situation is referred to as the backward key strategy and is shown in Fig.2 . In both situations, we investigate the inner and outer bounds of the secret key capacity region.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II the proposed model and definitions are described. In Section III, related theorems for the upper and lower bounds of the secret key capacity regions are given. Some special cases are considered in Section IV in which the inner bound coincides with the outer bound and the secret key capacity region can be derived. Proofs of the theorems are given in Section V. Conclusion and suggestions for future works are given in Section VI. Some lemmas useful for the proof of theorems are given and proofed in the appendix. Throughout the paper, a random variable is denoted with an upper case letter (e.g X ) and its realization is denoted with the corresponding lower case letter (e.g., x ). We use 
N X X X are mutually independent. The next steps can be regarded as deterministic.
Step 1) At this step, users 1, 2 and 3, respectively, generate 1,1
transmit them over the public channel.
Steps 2 to k) At step j , user i generates , and 1  1  3,  3,  3  3  1,1  2,1 ( , , , ) 
and also user 3 computes the keys K and L as a function of the information available at him:
where the keys K and L are intended for sharing as secret keys with users 1 and 2, respectively. The keys
L L take values from the finite sets  and  , respectively. Now we state the conditions that should be met in the secret key strategy of the described model. 
log ( ) (10) 
Equation (5) means that users 1 and 2 can generate secret keys with user 3 and Equations (6) and (7) say that users 1 and 2 have effectively no information about each other's secret key. Equations (9) and (10) are the uniformity conditions for the secret keys.
Definition 2:
The region containing all the achievable secret key rate pairs 1 2 ( , ) R R is the key capacity region.
In the described model, we consider restricted usage of the public channel, i.e., no more than k usages of the public channel are allowed. In this paper, only the case 1 k  is investigated. For this case, when communication is only performed from users 1 and 2 to user 3, forward key capacity region is defined and when communication is only carried out in the reverse direction, i.e., from user 3 to users 1 and 2, backward key capacity region is introduced. We consider both situations in this paper.
III. SECRET KEY RATE REGIONS
In this section, we state our main results about the mentioned model.
Theorem 1 (inner bound of the forward key capacity region):
In the forward key strategy of the described source model, the rate pair 1 2 ( , ) R R is an achievable key rate pair if: 
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R H S I S X U H S U V X T I S U V X T I S X U I S U X T I S X U I S U X T I S X U T I S X T U I S X T U
          
R R H S H T I S X U I T X V H S T U V X I S T X U V I S X T U I T X S V I S T U V
         
R R R I S T X U I S X U R I T S X V I T X V
for random variables , , , U V S T which take values in sufficiently large finite sets and form Markov chains as: ( , , , , ),
In addition, the following bound is an explicit upper bound which can be easily deduced from Theorem 1 of [1]:
The proof is given in Section V. B.
Corollary 1:
If user 2 is only interested in wiretapping and not sharing a secret key with user 3, random variables T and V can be assumed to be constant. In this case, the lower bound of Theorem 1 coincides with the upper bound of Theorem 2 and the forward secret key capacity between the users 1 and 3 would be equal to:
for random variables , U S which form a Markov chain as
. This result is in agreement with the result of Theorem 1 of [1] .
Theorem 3 (inner bound of the backward key capacity region):
In the backward secret key strategy of the described source model, the rate pair 1 2 ( , ) R R is an achievable key rate pair if:
where , U S and T are random variables taking values in sufficiently large finite sets and according to the distribution:
The proof is given in Section V. C. Intuitive interpretation of Theorem 3 is as follows. In the case of backward key capacity region, only user 3 is permitted to send information to users 1 and 2. In this case, user 3 considers two random variables , S T with distribution 3 ( , ) p s t x and intends to send required information so that users 1 and 2 can reconstruct random variables S and T , respectively, and then user 3 exploits these random variables for sharing secret keys with these users. First, it transmits realizations of random variable U which has distribution ( , ) p u s t and then sends information with rate 1 ( , ) H S X U so that user 1 can reconstruct S and information with rate 2 (
, ) H T X U so that user 2 can reconstruct T . Consequently, user 2 has access to random variables 2 , , X U T and also information with rate 1 ( , ) H S X U for obtaining information about user 1's key. So:
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With the same approach the rate 2 R can be deduced.
Theorem 4 (outer bound of the backward key capacity region):
In the backward secret key strategy of the described source model, if the rate pair 1 2 ( , ) R R is an achievable key rate pair, then it satisfies: 
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where , U S and T are random variables taking values in sufficiently large finite sets and according to the distribution
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The proof is given in Section V. D.
Corollary 2:
If user 2 is only interested in wiretapping and not sharing a secret key, the random variable T can be assumed to be constant. In this case, the lower bound of Theorem 3 coincides with the upper bound of Theorem 4 and the backward secret key capacity between user 1 and 3 would be equal to: 
IV. SPECIAL CASES
In his section, we discuss some special cases in which the secret key capacity region can be found. X X X   , then the forward and backward key capacity regions reduce to:
The achievability is obtained by replacing 1 2 , , X X X   , the secret key capacity region can be derived by symmetry from case 1.
Case 2: When sources 1 2 , X X and 3 X form a Markov chain as 1 3 2 X X X   , then the forward key capacity region reduces to:
The achievability is obtained by replacing 
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where U , S and T are random variables taking values in sufficiently large finite sets and according to the distribution 1 2 3  3  1 2 3 ( , , , , , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , , ) p u s t x x x p u s t p s t x p x x x  which form Markov chains as:
The existence of such random variables S and T can be deduced from the Markov chain 1
is shown in Fig.3 . For these random variables, we have 1 2 ( ; , ) ( ; , ) 0 I S T X U I S T X U   and so, achievability can be deduced from Theorem 3. The converse part can be directly deduced from Theorem 2. X X X  
V. PROOFS
In this section, proofs of the theorems in Section III are given.
A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1

Construction of the Codebooks
First, we describe random codebook generation at users 1 and 2. For a distribution ( ) p s , collection of codewords 
  exists and is unique and otherwise, he declares error. After decoding such , , 
N N s t should be decoded by user 3. The event E is defined as:
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In the third term for ( , ) (1,1) k k  we have:
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Finally, in the forth term for ( , ) (1,1) l l  we have:
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and hence, the decoding error probability can be bounded as:
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If we set: T . It is obvious that the encoding scheme can satisfy the uniformity conditions (9) and (10) in Definition 1.
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Analysis of Security Conditions
Now, we should analyze the security conditions (6) and (7) in Definition 1. User 2 attempts to obtain information about user 1's key and to this end, he exploits 2 2 N M , X and the information which is sent by user 1 on the public channel:
In the above equations, (a) follows from the independence of 2 M from other random variables, (b) from the fact that the index k is one of the indices of Finally for (e), we use Lemma 2 (which is given in part B of the Appendix) to show that:
Similarly, the security condition for user 2's key is satisfied as:
and so, the security conditions (6) and (7) 
B. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
For deriving upper bound of the forward key capacity region, we use the reliable and secure transmission conditions. In the forward key strategy, users 1 and 2, respectively, generate the keys K and L for sharing with user 3: 
and transmit them over the public channel so that user 3 can reconstruct K and L with an arbitrary probability of error 0   . According to Fano's inequality:
After reconstructing these keys, user 3 uses K and L as secret keys with users 1 and 2, respectively, and for arbitrarily small 0   , the following security conditions should be satisfied: , ) .
Now, we show that for keys that satisfy the reliability and security conditions described above, there exist random variables , , , U V S T that form Markov chains as mentioned in Theorem 2 and satisfy the following relations: 
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We prove upper bound for 1 R . The proof for 2 R can be deduced by symmetry. 
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and (f) from definition of the random variable Q which is uniformly distributed on {1 2 } , ,..., N and setting
Similarly, by using the above mentioned variables we have:
It can be seen that the desired equations are satisfied with random variables which form Markov chains as in Theorem 2.
C. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Construction of the Codebooks
First, we describe random codebook generation at user 3. For a distribution ( , ) p s t , collection of codewords, ( , ) 
Decoding and Error Probability Analysis
For decoding, users 1 and 2 receive the indices , , k l a   from the public channel and also observe the i.i.d. sequences 
s   exists and is unique and otherwise he declares error. User 2 decodes , , Now we analyze decoding error probability. We define: respectively. Events 1 E and 2 E are defined as:
The decoding error probabilities are bounded as:
and if we set:
or in other words: Definition 1 will be satisfied. It is obvious that the encoding scheme can satisfy the uniformity conditions (9) and (10) in Definition 1.
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Analysis of Security Conditions
Now, we should analyze the security conditions (6) and (7) in Definition 1. User 2 attempts to obtain information about user 1's key and to this end, he exploits 2 2 N M , X and the information which is sent by user 3 over the public channel, i.e., the indices k , l and a : 
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D. PROOF OF THEOREM 4
For deriving upper bounds of the backward key capacity region, we use the reliable and secure transmission conditions.
In the backward key strategy, user 3 generates the keys K and L for sharing with users 1 and 2, respectively:
Also, it sends 3 F over the public channel where 3
to enable users 1 and 2 to compute K and L , respectively, with an arbitrary probability of error 0   . According to Fano's inequality:
Also the security conditions require that: 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a source model for secret key generation were studied in which each of users 1 and 2 intends to share a secret key with user 3 where user 1 acts as a wiretapper for user 2 and vice versa. Three users could observe i.i.d outputs of correlated sources and there is a public channel between users. In the described model, the forward and backward key strategies were considered based on the direction of the public channel, i.e., from users 1 and 2 to user 3 or in the reverse direction. For both the forward and backward key strategies, inner and outer bounds of secret key capacity regions were derived. Our results also include the results of previous works such as [1] . Our upper and lower bounds did not coincide generally but some special cases were considered where these bounds were tight.
As the continuation of this work, we are now exploring a model similar to the described model but instead of the public channel, there is a generalized multiple access channel (MAC) between the terminals, where users 1 and 2 govern the inputs of the MAC and outputs are received by users 1, 2 and 3. Also as the future works, we can suggest the same problem of this paper for the situation where there is a two-way public channel i.e., from users 1 and 2 to user 3 and vice versa. Also unlimited usage of the public channel can be viewed as a generalization of the problem.
APPENDIX
A. LEMMA 1
For sufficiently large N and sufficiently small 1   , we have: For arbitrary random variables 1 2 , , K F F and sequences of random variables 2 3 , 
